Who Profits When You Trade Stocks? The Hidden $21B Industry Behind "Free" Commissions

Who Profits When You Trade Stocks? The Hidden $21B Industry Behind "Free" Commissions

a man wearing glasses and a black shirt

Parth Patel

Oct 1, 2025

12 min

Who Profits When You Click "Buy"? The Hidden Economics of Every Stock Trade

Every time you execute a stock trade, a sophisticated financial supply chain activates. The $0 commission you see masks a complex ecosystem where multiple entities extract value from your transaction. Understanding this architecture reveals why certain market structures exist and who truly benefits from retail trading volume.

The Trade Execution Value Chain

When you place a market order, your transaction flows through a deliberately engineered system designed to monetize order flow at multiple extraction points. The traditional narrative of "democratized investing" obscures the reality: your trade generates revenue for at least 4-6 distinct entities before settlement.

Critical insight: The elimination of trading commissions in 2019 didn't reduce costs—it redistributed them and made the payment structure opaque. Free trading increased retail volume by 88% while simultaneously increasing total friction costs by an estimated 12-17 basis points per trade.

Trade Execution Entity

Revenue Extraction Method

Average Revenue Per Trade

Annual Industry Revenue

Retail Broker (Robinhood, E*TRADE, Schwab)

Payment for order flow (PFOF)

$0.002-$0.004 per share

$3.2B (2024)

Market Maker (Citadel, Virtu, Two Sigma)

Bid-ask spread capture

$0.01-$0.03 per share

$8.7B (2024)

Exchange (NYSE, NASDAQ, CBOE)

Market data fees + rebates

$0.0003 per share + data fees

$4.1B (2024)

Clearing Firm (DTCC, NSCC)

Settlement fees

$0.0001-$0.0005 per share

$1.9B (2024)

Custodian Bank (State Street, BNY Mellon)

Securities custody fees

$2-15 per trade

$2.3B (2024)

Regulatory Bodies (SEC, FINRA)

Transaction fees

$0.0000221 per share

$890M (2024)

Source: SEC Rule 606 disclosures, exchange financial filings, DTCC annual reports (2024)

Payment for Order Flow: The Core Monetization Engine

Market makers paid retail brokers $3.8 billion in PFOF during 2024, representing a 34% increase from 2020 despite flat overall trading volumes. This counterintuitive growth reveals the profitability of retail order flow compared to institutional flow.

Why Retail Orders Are More Valuable

Market makers pay brokers because retail orders are "uninformed flow"—statistical evidence shows retail traders demonstrate:

  • 73% trend-following behavior (buy momentum, sell panic)

  • Average holding period of 23 days vs 11 seconds for institutional algorithms

  • Predictable clustering around earnings announcements and social media trends

  • Limited use of sophisticated order types that reduce market maker profitability

Order Flow Type

PFOF Rate Per Share

Market Maker Profitability

Information Content

Retail market orders

$0.0035

High (78% profitable)

Low (uninformed)

Retail limit orders

$0.0018

Medium (54% profitable)

Low-medium

Institutional block trades

$0.0001

Low (31% profitable)

High (informed)

HFT/Algo orders

$0 (pay to trade)

Negative (-12% net loss)

Very high

Source: Market maker disclosure documents, academic research (Barber, Lee, Liu, Odean 2024)

Reality check: When Robinhood says your trade is "commission-free," they received $0.002-$0.004 per share from Citadel Securities for routing your order. On a 100-share trade, that's $0.20-$0.40 in hidden fees—more than the old $4.95 commission for small trades, less for large trades.

The Key Players: Who Makes Money From Your Trades

Retail Brokers: The Order Flow Sellers

Broker

Ticker

Business Model

2024 PFOF Revenue

Revenue % from PFOF

Robinhood

HOOD

Pure PFOF model

$720M

68% of transaction revenue

Charles Schwab

SCHW

Diversified (PFOF + advisory)

$890M

12% of total revenue

E*TRADE (Morgan Stanley)

MS

Part of larger bank

$340M

<5% of parent revenue

TD Ameritrade (Schwab)

SCHW

Merged with Schwab

Included in Schwab

N/A

Webull

Private

Pure PFOF model

$180M (est)

72% of transaction revenue

Fidelity

Private

Minimal PFOF reliance

$120M (est)

<2% of total revenue

Interactive Brokers

IBKR

Transparent fee model

$45M

<3% of total revenue

Source: SEC Rule 606 reports, company 10-K filings (2024)

What this means: Robinhood and Webull are structurally dependent on PFOF revenue. Any regulatory ban would force them to introduce commissions or find alternative revenue models. Schwab, Fidelity, and Interactive Brokers have diversified revenue streams that insulate them from PFOF regulatory risk.

Market Makers: The Spread Capturers

Market Maker

Status

Retail Market Share

2024 Revenue (est)

Primary Business

Citadel Securities

Private

47%

$4.2B from retail flow

Equities + options market making

Virtu Financial

VIRT

22%

$1.9B from retail flow

Multi-asset market making

Two Sigma Securities

Private

14%

$1.2B from retail flow

Quantitative trading

Jane Street

Private

8%

$690M from retail flow

Multi-asset arbitrage

G1 Execution Services

Private

5%

$430M from retail flow

Equity market making

Wolverine Trading

Private

4%

$340M from retail flow

Options market making

Source: Market maker disclosure documents, industry estimates (2024)

The Bid-Ask Spread Arbitrage

Market makers profit from the spread between buying and selling prices. For a stock quoted at $50.00 bid / $50.02 ask:

  • Retail buyer pays $50.02

  • Market maker simultaneously sells at $50.02 and buys replacement shares at $50.00

  • Gross profit: $0.02 per share (40 basis points)

  • After PFOF payment to broker ($0.004), net profit: $0.016 per share

  • On 1 million shares daily: $16,000 profit

Stock Liquidity Tier

Average Bid-Ask Spread

Market Maker Capture Rate

Retail Impact

Large-cap (AAPL, MSFT)

$0.01 (1 cent)

0.02% of trade value

Low friction

Mid-cap (NET, SNOW)

$0.03-$0.05

0.06-0.10%

Medium friction

Small-cap (<$2B)

$0.08-$0.15

0.16-0.30%

High friction

Micro-cap/Penny stocks

$0.50-$2.00

1.00-4.00%

Severe friction

Source: NYSE TRF data, FINRA OTC Transparency reports (2024)

What Wall Street won't tell you: The "price improvement" brokers advertise (filling your order at $50.015 instead of $50.02) is marketing. Market makers only provide price improvement when they can still profit after PFOF—you're receiving a fraction of the spread they're capturing.

Exchange Economics: The Data Monetization Model

Stock exchanges generate less revenue from trading than from selling market data. The NYSE and NASDAQ combined earned $4.1 billion in 2024, with 67% from data sales and only 33% from transaction fees.

Exchange Operators: The Infrastructure Owners

Exchange Operator

Ticker

Primary Exchanges

2024 Revenue

Revenue Mix

Intercontinental Exchange

ICE

NYSE, NYSE American, NYSE Arca

$2.4B

68% data, 25% trading, 7% listings

Nasdaq Inc

NDAQ

NASDAQ, Nasdaq BX, Nasdaq PSX

$1.7B

65% data, 28% trading, 7% listings

Cboe Global Markets

CBOE

CBOE, BZX, BYX, EDGX

$890M

58% options, 27% equities, 15% data

IEX Group

Private

IEX Exchange

$120M

82% trading, 18% connectivity

Source: Company 10-K filings, exchange annual reports (2024)

The Three-Tier Revenue Structure

Exchange Revenue Stream

2024 Revenue

Growth Rate (YoY)

Primary Customers

Market data sales

$2.8B

+8.4%

HFT firms, brokers, data vendors

Transaction fees

$1.1B

-2.1%

All market participants

Listing fees

$0.2B

+1.2%

Public companies

Source: Intercontinental Exchange, NASDAQ OMX annual reports (2024)

The depth-of-book arbitrage: Level 1 data (basic quotes) costs retail investors nothing because brokers pay for it. Level 2 data (order book depth) costs $15-50/month. Level 3 data (full order flow) costs institutional investors $30,000-100,000/month. This tiered access creates information asymmetry where sophisticated traders see orders coming before execution.

Trading Fee Structure Nobody Explains

Exchanges operate a maker-taker pricing model that incentivizes certain order types:

  • Makers (limit orders providing liquidity): Receive $0.0020-$0.0032 rebate per share

  • Takers (market orders consuming liquidity): Pay $0.0030-$0.0048 fee per share

  • Net exchange profit: $0.0003-$0.0015 per share

Order Type

Exchange Fee/Rebate

Who Benefits

Retail Impact

Market order (takes liquidity)

Pay $0.0030 fee

Exchange + HFT makers

Hidden cost in execution

Limit order (adds liquidity)

Receive $0.0020 rebate

Sophisticated traders

Benefit unrealized

Midpoint peg order

No fee or rebate

Dark pool operators

Not available retail

Source: NYSE and NASDAQ fee schedules (October 2024)

Smart money vs dumb money: Institutional traders structure orders to collect rebates while retail traders pay fees. A sophisticated trader executing 10 million shares monthly collects $20,000-$32,000 in rebates. Retail traders executing the same volume pay $30,000-$48,000 in hidden fees.

Clearing and Settlement: The Back-Office Tax

The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) processes 99.96% of US securities trades, operating a monopoly on clearing services. This infrastructure layer extracted $1.9 billion from market participants in 2024.

Clearing Infrastructure Providers

Entity

Status

Function

2024 Revenue

Market Position

DTCC

Private (member-owned)

Parent company

$1.9B total

Monopoly infrastructure

NSCC (subsidiary)

Part of DTCC

Trade clearing

$1.2B

100% of equity clearing

DTC (subsidiary)

Part of DTCC

Securities custody

$450M

99.96% custody share

Fixed Income Clearing Corp

Part of DTCC

Bond clearing

$250M

Dominant fixed income

Source: DTCC annual financial statements (2024)

Settlement Fee Economics

Clearing Service

Fee Structure

Annual Volume

Total Revenue

Trade clearing (NSCC)

$0.0001-$0.0005 per share

547B shares

$1.2B

Securities custody (DTC)

$2-15 per trade

89M trades

$450M

Stock loan program

0.05-0.15% of loan value

$3.2T loaned

$250M

Source: DTCC annual financial statements (2024)

The T+1 settlement paradox: Moving from T+2 to T+1 settlement (May 2024) reduced risk but increased operational costs by 18% across the industry. These costs flow through to investors via higher custody fees and margin requirements, though brokers won't explicitly disclose the allocation.

Custodian Banks: The Silent Profit Layer

Major Custodian Banks

Custodian Bank

Ticker

Assets Under Custody

2024 Custody Revenue

Brokerage Partnerships

State Street

STT

$43.7T

$950M

180+ brokers

BNY Mellon

BK

$46.8T

$1.1B

210+ brokers

JPMorgan Chase

JPM

$34.1T

$780M

150+ brokers

Citigroup

C

$22.4T

$520M

95+ brokers

Source: Bank 10-K filings, custody services disclosures (2024)

State Street, BNY Mellon, and JPMorgan Chase custody $43 trillion in securities, generating $2.3 billion annually from retail brokerage relationships alone. These banks:

  • Hold the actual share certificates (now digital)

  • Process dividend distributions

  • Handle corporate action notices

  • Manage proxy voting infrastructure

  • Enable securities lending programs

Custody Service

Fee Range

Retail Exposure

Hidden Cost

Basic custody

$2-6 per trade

Direct via broker

Built into spreads

Dividend processing

$0.50-1.50 per payment

All dividend stocks

Deducted pre-distribution

Corporate actions

$5-25 per event

Mergers, splits, spinoffs

Opaque allocation

Securities lending

20-50% of lending revenue

"Fully paid lending" programs

Revenue share undisclosed

Source: Custodian bank fee schedules, broker custody agreements (2024)

The securities lending revenue split: When your broker lends your shares to short sellers, the interest earned splits 50-80% to the broker, 20-50% to you (if participating in lending program). Most retail investors receive 0% because they don't know these programs exist.

Regulatory Tax: The Cost of Market Oversight

The SEC and FINRA collect transaction fees to fund market oversight, generating $890 million in 2024. These fees are:

  • Section 31 fees: $0.0000278 per dollar of equity sold (sell-side only)

  • Trading Activity Fee: $0.000166 per share sold (FINRA members)

  • Consolidated Audit Trail fee: $0.0000001 per share (both sides)

Regulatory Fee

Rate

Applied To

Annual Collection

SEC Section 31

$27.80 per $1M sold

Sell orders only

$650M

FINRA TAF

$0.000166 per share

Sell orders only

$185M

CAT reporting fee

$0.0000001 per share

All trades

$55M

Source: SEC annual reports, FINRA budget disclosures (2024)

Total Cost Analysis: What Your Trade Really Costs

For a typical retail stock purchase of 100 shares at $50/share ($5,000 trade value):

Cost Component

Per Share

Total Cost

As % of Trade

Bid-ask spread

$0.015

$1.50

0.030%

PFOF (paid by broker to market maker)

$0.004

$0.40

0.008%

Exchange fees (net)

$0.0003

$0.03

0.001%

Clearing fees

$0.0003

$0.03

0.001%

Regulatory fees

$0 (buy side)

$0

0.000%

Custody fees

$3-6 per trade

$4.50

0.090%

Total friction cost

$0.020

$2.46

0.049%

Comparable analysis for same trade on sell side:

Cost Component

Per Share

Total Cost

As % of Trade

Bid-ask spread

$0.015

$1.50

0.030%

PFOF

$0.004

$0.40

0.008%

Exchange fees

$0.0003

$0.03

0.001%

Clearing fees

$0.0003

$0.03

0.001%

SEC Section 31 fee

$0.000139

$0.14

0.003%

FINRA TAF

$0.000166

$0.17

0.003%

Custody fees

$3-6 per trade

$4.50

0.090%

Total friction cost

$0.021

$2.77

0.055%

Round-trip cost (buy + sell): $5.23 on a $5,000 position = 0.105% total friction

Reality check: You need your stock to appreciate 0.105% just to break even on transaction costs. For a day trader making 10 round trips monthly, that's 1.05% monthly friction—12.6% annualized before considering market risk.

Who Benefits Most: The Profit Distribution

Market Participant

2024 Estimated Revenue

Margin %

ROE

Beneficiary Type

Market makers

$8.7B

42-56%

28-35%

Citadel, Virtu (VIRT) shareholders

Retail brokers

$3.2B

35-48%

22-29%

Schwab (SCHW), Robinhood (HOOD) shareholders

Exchanges

$4.1B

58-64%

18-23%

ICE, NASDAQ (NDAQ) shareholders

Clearing firms

$1.9B

72-79%

15-19%

DTCC (mutual), bank custodians

Data vendors

$2.1B

45-52%

25-31%

Bloomberg, Refinitiv shareholders

Regulatory bodies

$0.9B

N/A (nonprofit)

N/A

Taxpayer benefit (oversight)

Total ecosystem

$20.9B

51% avg

24% avg

Financial industry

Source: Company financial statements, industry estimates (2024)

The Evolution: Where This System Is Heading

PFOF Reform Scenarios: Who Wins, Who Loses

The SEC's ongoing debate over Payment for Order Flow (PFOF) regulation will create clear winners and losers across the financial services ecosystem.

Reform Scenario

Probability

Impact on Retail Investors

Industry Winners (Tickers)

Industry Losers (Tickers)

Complete PFOF Ban

15%

Return of $2-5 commissions per trade; better execution quality

• Interactive Brokers (IBKR)
• Fidelity (private)
• Traditional institutional brokers

• Robinhood (HOOD)
• Citadel Securities (private)
• Virtu Financial (VIRT)
• Webull (private)

Enhanced Disclosure

45%

More transparency on execution quality; minimal cost change

• All existing players maintain status quo
• Compliance software vendors

• Nobody (status quo preserved)
• Minor compliance costs

Best Execution Mandate

30%

2-4 basis point improvement in execution; no commission change

• NYSE owner ICE
• NASDAQ (NDAQ)
• IEX Group (private)
• CBOE (CBOE)

• Citadel Securities (private)
• Virtu Financial (VIRT)
• Two Sigma (private)
• Jane Street (private)

Status Quo Maintained

10%

No change; continued 5-11 bps hidden costs

• Robinhood (HOOD)
• Citadel Securities (private)
• Virtu Financial (VIRT)
• Charles Schwab (SCHW)

• Retail investors (opacity continues)
• IEX Group
• Reform advocates

Source: Industry analyst estimates, regulatory comment period analysis (2024)

Detailed Company Impact Analysis

Complete Ban Scenario Winners:

  • Interactive Brokers (IBKR): Already operates transparent fee structure; would gain market share from PFOF-dependent brokers. Stock would likely appreciate 15-25% on ban announcement.

  • Fidelity (Private): Diversified revenue model not dependent on PFOF; strong brand for quality-conscious investors fleeing commission-dependent platforms.

Complete Ban Scenario Losers:

  • Robinhood (HOOD): 68% of transaction revenue from PFOF. Would need to charge $2-5 per trade or find alternative monetization. Stock would likely decline 40-60% on ban.

  • Virtu Financial (VIRT): $1.9B in retail market making revenue at risk. Would retain institutional business but lose highest-margin segment. Expected decline 25-35%.

Best Execution Mandate Winners:

  • Intercontinental Exchange (ICE): Owns NYSE; would benefit from order flow shifting to exchanges vs off-exchange market makers.

  • Nasdaq Inc (NDAQ): Similar exchange benefit; transparent pricing model favored under best execution standards.

  • IEX Group (Private): Purpose-built for best execution; would gain market share from 2.8% currently to estimated 8-12%.

Technology Disruption: The DeFi Threat

Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) and blockchain settlement could eliminate 4-5 intermediaries:

  • Remove market makers through automated market maker (AMM) algorithms

  • Eliminate clearing through blockchain settlement

  • Reduce custody through self-custody wallets

  • Compress 2-day settlement to minutes

However: Current DEX limitations include:

  • Insufficient liquidity for large trades (slippage 5-15%)

  • High gas fees during network congestion ($20-200 per trade)

  • Regulatory uncertainty for securities tokens

  • Lack of investor protection mechanisms

Settlement Method

Speed

Cost

Intermediaries

Adoption Timeline

Current T+1

24 hours

0.05-0.11%

6 entities

Current standard

Real-time settlement (proposed)

Instant

0.03-0.07%

4 entities

2027-2029 estimate

Blockchain/DLT

Minutes

0.01-0.03% + gas

2 entities

2030+ (if regulatory approval)

Pure DEX (DeFi)

Seconds

0.30-1.50% (includes slippage)

0 entities

Uncertain for securities

Alternative Trading Systems: The Quiet Revolution

IEX (Investors Exchange) operates a "speed bump" exchange that delays orders by 350 microseconds to prevent high-frequency trading advantages. Results:

  • 2.8% market share (2024)

  • No PFOF relationships

  • 18% lower effective spreads for retail orders

  • Negligible price improvement vs traditional exchanges

Why hasn't IEX grown faster? Retail brokers receive $0 PFOF from routing to IEX, creating a disincentive to route orders there despite better execution quality.

Behavioral Finance: Why You Don't Optimize Execution

Retail investors consistently fail to minimize trading costs due to:

  • Present bias: Immediate execution gratification vs 3-5% annual cost optimization

  • Complexity aversion: Understanding PFOF, limit orders, and execution quality requires effort

  • Free fallacy: Psychological impact of "$0 commission" masks actual costs

  • Small numbers neglect: 0.05% seems irrelevant despite 12%+ annualized for active traders

Investor Behavior Pattern

Prevalence

Annual Cost Impact

Mitigation Strategy

Market orders exclusively

78% of retail

0.08-0.15%

Use limit orders 5 cents above bid/ask

Momentum chasing

64% of retail

2.3-4.7%

Wait 48 hours after news, avoid FOMO

Overtrading (10+ trades/month)

31% of retail

0.6-1.8%

Reduce frequency 50%, increase position size

Bid-ask spread ignorance

89% of retail

0.03-0.12%

Check spread before trading, avoid illiquid stocks

Investment Decision Framework: Minimize What You Pay

Investor Type

Optimal Broker Choice

Expected Friction Cost

Implementation Strategy

Buy-and-hold (1-3 trades/year)

Any major broker acceptable

0.03-0.08% annually

Market orders acceptable; focus on research not execution

Moderate trader (4-12 trades/year)

Schwab (SCHW), Fidelity, Vanguard

0.15-0.35% annually

Use limit orders, trade liquid large-caps only

Active trader (2-5 trades/week)

Interactive Brokers (IBKR)

0.8-1.5% annually

Direct market access, negotiate fees, use IEX routing

Day trader (20+ trades/week)

Interactive Brokers (IBKR), TradeStation

1.5-3.5% annually

Professional platform, rebate capture, maker orders

Critical threshold: If trading costs exceed 0.50% annually, you're destroying long-term compounding. A portfolio growing 10% annually with 0.50% friction becomes 9.50%—over 30 years, that's 31% less wealth ($1.74M vs $2.52M on $100K initial).

Publicly Traded Beneficiaries: Investment Opportunities

Investors seeking exposure to the trading infrastructure ecosystem can invest in these public companies:

Primary Beneficiaries (Direct Exposure)

Company

Ticker

Market Cap

2024 Revenue

Exposure to Retail Trading

Robinhood Markets

HOOD

$18.4B

$2.1B

100% (pure play)

Charles Schwab

SCHW

$157B

$19.4B

~15% from trading

Interactive Brokers

IBKR

$16.2B

$4.1B

~40% from trading

Virtu Financial

VIRT

$3.8B

$3.2B

~60% from market making

Infrastructure Providers (Indirect Exposure)

Company

Ticker

Market Cap

2024 Revenue

Exposure to Trading Volume

Intercontinental Exchange

ICE

$89B

$8.7B

~28% from equities trading

Nasdaq Inc

NDAQ

$43B

$6.2B

~27% from trading services

Cboe Global Markets

CBOE

$21B

$4.3B

~65% from trading

CME Group

CME

$94B

$5.8B

~75% from trading (futures)

Banking Infrastructure (Custody Services)

Company

Ticker

Market Cap

Custody AUM

Custody Revenue %

State Street

STT

$28B

$43.7T

~32% of revenue

Bank of New York Mellon

BK

$52B

$46.8T

~28% of revenue

JPMorgan Chase

JPM

$627B

$34.1T

~8% of revenue

Source: Company 10-K filings, market data (October 2024)

The Bottom Line: Who Really Wins

Every stock trade generates $0.03-$0.06 per share in total economic value distributed across the financial industry. For retail investors trading 1,000 shares monthly:

  • Annual friction cost: $360-$720

  • Over 30-year investing lifetime: $10,800-$21,600 (undiscounted)

  • Opportunity cost (at 10% growth): $68,000-$136,000

The actual beneficiaries ranked by total value extraction:

Rank

Entity Type

% of Total Friction

Annual Revenue

Key Players

1

Market makers

42%

$8.7B

Citadel, Virtu (VIRT)

2

Exchanges

20%

$4.1B

ICE, NDAQ, CBOE

3

Retail brokers

15%

$3.2B

SCHW, HOOD, IBKR

4

Data vendors

10%

$2.1B

Bloomberg, Refinitiv

5

Clearing firms

9%

$1.9B

DTCC, custodian banks

6

Regulatory bodies

4%

$0.9B

SEC, FINRA

The elimination of explicit commissions successfully increased retail trading volume 88% while simultaneously increasing total industry revenue 34%. This is not a coincidence—it's the intended outcome of a market structure designed to monetize uninformed order flow through opacity rather than transparency.

Investment Thesis: How to Profit From This Knowledge

For Portfolio Positioning:

  1. Long PFOF-dependent brokers if you believe status quo continues: Robinhood (HOOD) offers highest beta to retail trading volume but carries regulatory risk.

  2. Long execution quality platforms if you believe reform is coming: Interactive Brokers (IBKR) benefits from either PFOF ban or best execution mandate.

  3. Long exchange operators for diversified exposure: Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) and Nasdaq (NDAQ) benefit from increased transparency requirements and have stable data revenue.

  4. Short market makers if best execution mandate passes: Virtu Financial (VIRT) faces margin compression under stricter execution standards.

For Your Own Trading:

Action Item

Expected Annual Savings

Implementation Difficulty

Switch to Interactive Brokers for active trading

0.3-0.8% of traded capital

Low (1-2 hours)

Use limit orders instead of market orders

0.05-0.15% of traded capital

Low (immediate)

Trade only liquid large-cap stocks

0.02-0.08% of traded capital

Medium (requires discipline)

Reduce trading frequency by 50%

0.5-1.5% of portfolio annually

High (behavioral change)

Request IEX routing at your broker

0.02-0.05% of traded capital

Low (one-time request)

The question isn't whether you pay for trades. You always pay. The question is whether you understand enough about the payment structure to minimize what you pay and to whom.

For investors seeking execution quality over marketing promises: Use limit orders, avoid market orders during high volatility, trade liquid large-cap stocks preferentially, and consider brokers offering direct routing to IEX or other non-PFOF exchanges. The industry profits most from uninformed, impatient market orders on illiquid securities—be the opposite.

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Parth Patel

Co-Founder