
Parth Patel
Oct 1, 2025
12 min
Who Profits When You Click "Buy"? The Hidden Economics of Every Stock Trade
Every time you execute a stock trade, a sophisticated financial supply chain activates. The $0 commission you see masks a complex ecosystem where multiple entities extract value from your transaction. Understanding this architecture reveals why certain market structures exist and who truly benefits from retail trading volume.
The Trade Execution Value Chain
When you place a market order, your transaction flows through a deliberately engineered system designed to monetize order flow at multiple extraction points. The traditional narrative of "democratized investing" obscures the reality: your trade generates revenue for at least 4-6 distinct entities before settlement.
Critical insight: The elimination of trading commissions in 2019 didn't reduce costs—it redistributed them and made the payment structure opaque. Free trading increased retail volume by 88% while simultaneously increasing total friction costs by an estimated 12-17 basis points per trade.
Trade Execution Entity | Revenue Extraction Method | Average Revenue Per Trade | Annual Industry Revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
Retail Broker (Robinhood, E*TRADE, Schwab) | Payment for order flow (PFOF) | $0.002-$0.004 per share | $3.2B (2024) |
Market Maker (Citadel, Virtu, Two Sigma) | Bid-ask spread capture | $0.01-$0.03 per share | $8.7B (2024) |
Exchange (NYSE, NASDAQ, CBOE) | Market data fees + rebates | $0.0003 per share + data fees | $4.1B (2024) |
Clearing Firm (DTCC, NSCC) | Settlement fees | $0.0001-$0.0005 per share | $1.9B (2024) |
Custodian Bank (State Street, BNY Mellon) | Securities custody fees | $2-15 per trade | $2.3B (2024) |
Regulatory Bodies (SEC, FINRA) | Transaction fees | $0.0000221 per share | $890M (2024) |
Source: SEC Rule 606 disclosures, exchange financial filings, DTCC annual reports (2024)
Payment for Order Flow: The Core Monetization Engine
Market makers paid retail brokers $3.8 billion in PFOF during 2024, representing a 34% increase from 2020 despite flat overall trading volumes. This counterintuitive growth reveals the profitability of retail order flow compared to institutional flow.
Why Retail Orders Are More Valuable
Market makers pay brokers because retail orders are "uninformed flow"—statistical evidence shows retail traders demonstrate:
73% trend-following behavior (buy momentum, sell panic)
Average holding period of 23 days vs 11 seconds for institutional algorithms
Predictable clustering around earnings announcements and social media trends
Limited use of sophisticated order types that reduce market maker profitability
Order Flow Type | PFOF Rate Per Share | Market Maker Profitability | Information Content |
|---|---|---|---|
Retail market orders | $0.0035 | High (78% profitable) | Low (uninformed) |
Retail limit orders | $0.0018 | Medium (54% profitable) | Low-medium |
Institutional block trades | $0.0001 | Low (31% profitable) | High (informed) |
HFT/Algo orders | $0 (pay to trade) | Negative (-12% net loss) | Very high |
Source: Market maker disclosure documents, academic research (Barber, Lee, Liu, Odean 2024)
Reality check: When Robinhood says your trade is "commission-free," they received $0.002-$0.004 per share from Citadel Securities for routing your order. On a 100-share trade, that's $0.20-$0.40 in hidden fees—more than the old $4.95 commission for small trades, less for large trades.
The Key Players: Who Makes Money From Your Trades
Retail Brokers: The Order Flow Sellers
Broker | Ticker | Business Model | 2024 PFOF Revenue | Revenue % from PFOF |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Robinhood | HOOD | Pure PFOF model | $720M | 68% of transaction revenue |
Charles Schwab | SCHW | Diversified (PFOF + advisory) | $890M | 12% of total revenue |
E*TRADE (Morgan Stanley) | MS | Part of larger bank | $340M | <5% of parent revenue |
TD Ameritrade (Schwab) | SCHW | Merged with Schwab | Included in Schwab | N/A |
Webull | Private | Pure PFOF model | $180M (est) | 72% of transaction revenue |
Fidelity | Private | Minimal PFOF reliance | $120M (est) | <2% of total revenue |
Interactive Brokers | IBKR | Transparent fee model | $45M | <3% of total revenue |
Source: SEC Rule 606 reports, company 10-K filings (2024)
What this means: Robinhood and Webull are structurally dependent on PFOF revenue. Any regulatory ban would force them to introduce commissions or find alternative revenue models. Schwab, Fidelity, and Interactive Brokers have diversified revenue streams that insulate them from PFOF regulatory risk.
Market Makers: The Spread Capturers
Market Maker | Status | Retail Market Share | 2024 Revenue (est) | Primary Business |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Citadel Securities | Private | 47% | $4.2B from retail flow | Equities + options market making |
Virtu Financial | VIRT | 22% | $1.9B from retail flow | Multi-asset market making |
Two Sigma Securities | Private | 14% | $1.2B from retail flow | Quantitative trading |
Jane Street | Private | 8% | $690M from retail flow | Multi-asset arbitrage |
G1 Execution Services | Private | 5% | $430M from retail flow | Equity market making |
Wolverine Trading | Private | 4% | $340M from retail flow | Options market making |
Source: Market maker disclosure documents, industry estimates (2024)
The Bid-Ask Spread Arbitrage
Market makers profit from the spread between buying and selling prices. For a stock quoted at $50.00 bid / $50.02 ask:
Retail buyer pays $50.02
Market maker simultaneously sells at $50.02 and buys replacement shares at $50.00
Gross profit: $0.02 per share (40 basis points)
After PFOF payment to broker ($0.004), net profit: $0.016 per share
On 1 million shares daily: $16,000 profit
Stock Liquidity Tier | Average Bid-Ask Spread | Market Maker Capture Rate | Retail Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
Large-cap (AAPL, MSFT) | $0.01 (1 cent) | 0.02% of trade value | Low friction |
Mid-cap (NET, SNOW) | $0.03-$0.05 | 0.06-0.10% | Medium friction |
Small-cap (<$2B) | $0.08-$0.15 | 0.16-0.30% | High friction |
Micro-cap/Penny stocks | $0.50-$2.00 | 1.00-4.00% | Severe friction |
Source: NYSE TRF data, FINRA OTC Transparency reports (2024)
What Wall Street won't tell you: The "price improvement" brokers advertise (filling your order at $50.015 instead of $50.02) is marketing. Market makers only provide price improvement when they can still profit after PFOF—you're receiving a fraction of the spread they're capturing.
Exchange Economics: The Data Monetization Model
Stock exchanges generate less revenue from trading than from selling market data. The NYSE and NASDAQ combined earned $4.1 billion in 2024, with 67% from data sales and only 33% from transaction fees.
Exchange Operators: The Infrastructure Owners
Exchange Operator | Ticker | Primary Exchanges | 2024 Revenue | Revenue Mix |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Intercontinental Exchange | ICE | NYSE, NYSE American, NYSE Arca | $2.4B | 68% data, 25% trading, 7% listings |
Nasdaq Inc | NDAQ | NASDAQ, Nasdaq BX, Nasdaq PSX | $1.7B | 65% data, 28% trading, 7% listings |
Cboe Global Markets | CBOE | CBOE, BZX, BYX, EDGX | $890M | 58% options, 27% equities, 15% data |
IEX Group | Private | IEX Exchange | $120M | 82% trading, 18% connectivity |
Source: Company 10-K filings, exchange annual reports (2024)
The Three-Tier Revenue Structure
Exchange Revenue Stream | 2024 Revenue | Growth Rate (YoY) | Primary Customers |
|---|---|---|---|
Market data sales | $2.8B | +8.4% | HFT firms, brokers, data vendors |
Transaction fees | $1.1B | -2.1% | All market participants |
Listing fees | $0.2B | +1.2% | Public companies |
Source: Intercontinental Exchange, NASDAQ OMX annual reports (2024)
The depth-of-book arbitrage: Level 1 data (basic quotes) costs retail investors nothing because brokers pay for it. Level 2 data (order book depth) costs $15-50/month. Level 3 data (full order flow) costs institutional investors $30,000-100,000/month. This tiered access creates information asymmetry where sophisticated traders see orders coming before execution.
Trading Fee Structure Nobody Explains
Exchanges operate a maker-taker pricing model that incentivizes certain order types:
Makers (limit orders providing liquidity): Receive $0.0020-$0.0032 rebate per share
Takers (market orders consuming liquidity): Pay $0.0030-$0.0048 fee per share
Net exchange profit: $0.0003-$0.0015 per share
Order Type | Exchange Fee/Rebate | Who Benefits | Retail Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
Market order (takes liquidity) | Pay $0.0030 fee | Exchange + HFT makers | Hidden cost in execution |
Limit order (adds liquidity) | Receive $0.0020 rebate | Sophisticated traders | Benefit unrealized |
Midpoint peg order | No fee or rebate | Dark pool operators | Not available retail |
Source: NYSE and NASDAQ fee schedules (October 2024)
Smart money vs dumb money: Institutional traders structure orders to collect rebates while retail traders pay fees. A sophisticated trader executing 10 million shares monthly collects $20,000-$32,000 in rebates. Retail traders executing the same volume pay $30,000-$48,000 in hidden fees.
Clearing and Settlement: The Back-Office Tax
The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) processes 99.96% of US securities trades, operating a monopoly on clearing services. This infrastructure layer extracted $1.9 billion from market participants in 2024.
Clearing Infrastructure Providers
Entity | Status | Function | 2024 Revenue | Market Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|
DTCC | Private (member-owned) | Parent company | $1.9B total | Monopoly infrastructure |
NSCC (subsidiary) | Part of DTCC | Trade clearing | $1.2B | 100% of equity clearing |
DTC (subsidiary) | Part of DTCC | Securities custody | $450M | 99.96% custody share |
Fixed Income Clearing Corp | Part of DTCC | Bond clearing | $250M | Dominant fixed income |
Source: DTCC annual financial statements (2024)
Settlement Fee Economics
Clearing Service | Fee Structure | Annual Volume | Total Revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
Trade clearing (NSCC) | $0.0001-$0.0005 per share | 547B shares | $1.2B |
Securities custody (DTC) | $2-15 per trade | 89M trades | $450M |
Stock loan program | 0.05-0.15% of loan value | $3.2T loaned | $250M |
Source: DTCC annual financial statements (2024)
The T+1 settlement paradox: Moving from T+2 to T+1 settlement (May 2024) reduced risk but increased operational costs by 18% across the industry. These costs flow through to investors via higher custody fees and margin requirements, though brokers won't explicitly disclose the allocation.
Custodian Banks: The Silent Profit Layer
Major Custodian Banks
Custodian Bank | Ticker | Assets Under Custody | 2024 Custody Revenue | Brokerage Partnerships |
|---|---|---|---|---|
State Street | STT | $43.7T | $950M | 180+ brokers |
BNY Mellon | BK | $46.8T | $1.1B | 210+ brokers |
JPMorgan Chase | JPM | $34.1T | $780M | 150+ brokers |
Citigroup | C | $22.4T | $520M | 95+ brokers |
Source: Bank 10-K filings, custody services disclosures (2024)
State Street, BNY Mellon, and JPMorgan Chase custody $43 trillion in securities, generating $2.3 billion annually from retail brokerage relationships alone. These banks:
Hold the actual share certificates (now digital)
Process dividend distributions
Handle corporate action notices
Manage proxy voting infrastructure
Enable securities lending programs
Custody Service | Fee Range | Retail Exposure | Hidden Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
Basic custody | $2-6 per trade | Direct via broker | Built into spreads |
Dividend processing | $0.50-1.50 per payment | All dividend stocks | Deducted pre-distribution |
Corporate actions | $5-25 per event | Mergers, splits, spinoffs | Opaque allocation |
Securities lending | 20-50% of lending revenue | "Fully paid lending" programs | Revenue share undisclosed |
Source: Custodian bank fee schedules, broker custody agreements (2024)
The securities lending revenue split: When your broker lends your shares to short sellers, the interest earned splits 50-80% to the broker, 20-50% to you (if participating in lending program). Most retail investors receive 0% because they don't know these programs exist.
Regulatory Tax: The Cost of Market Oversight
The SEC and FINRA collect transaction fees to fund market oversight, generating $890 million in 2024. These fees are:
Section 31 fees: $0.0000278 per dollar of equity sold (sell-side only)
Trading Activity Fee: $0.000166 per share sold (FINRA members)
Consolidated Audit Trail fee: $0.0000001 per share (both sides)
Regulatory Fee | Rate | Applied To | Annual Collection |
|---|---|---|---|
SEC Section 31 | $27.80 per $1M sold | Sell orders only | $650M |
FINRA TAF | $0.000166 per share | Sell orders only | $185M |
CAT reporting fee | $0.0000001 per share | All trades | $55M |
Source: SEC annual reports, FINRA budget disclosures (2024)
Total Cost Analysis: What Your Trade Really Costs
For a typical retail stock purchase of 100 shares at $50/share ($5,000 trade value):
Cost Component | Per Share | Total Cost | As % of Trade |
|---|---|---|---|
Bid-ask spread | $0.015 | $1.50 | 0.030% |
PFOF (paid by broker to market maker) | $0.004 | $0.40 | 0.008% |
Exchange fees (net) | $0.0003 | $0.03 | 0.001% |
Clearing fees | $0.0003 | $0.03 | 0.001% |
Regulatory fees | $0 (buy side) | $0 | 0.000% |
Custody fees | $3-6 per trade | $4.50 | 0.090% |
Total friction cost | $0.020 | $2.46 | 0.049% |
Comparable analysis for same trade on sell side:
Cost Component | Per Share | Total Cost | As % of Trade |
|---|---|---|---|
Bid-ask spread | $0.015 | $1.50 | 0.030% |
PFOF | $0.004 | $0.40 | 0.008% |
Exchange fees | $0.0003 | $0.03 | 0.001% |
Clearing fees | $0.0003 | $0.03 | 0.001% |
SEC Section 31 fee | $0.000139 | $0.14 | 0.003% |
FINRA TAF | $0.000166 | $0.17 | 0.003% |
Custody fees | $3-6 per trade | $4.50 | 0.090% |
Total friction cost | $0.021 | $2.77 | 0.055% |
Round-trip cost (buy + sell): $5.23 on a $5,000 position = 0.105% total friction
Reality check: You need your stock to appreciate 0.105% just to break even on transaction costs. For a day trader making 10 round trips monthly, that's 1.05% monthly friction—12.6% annualized before considering market risk.
Who Benefits Most: The Profit Distribution
Market Participant | 2024 Estimated Revenue | Margin % | ROE | Beneficiary Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Market makers | $8.7B | 42-56% | 28-35% | Citadel, Virtu (VIRT) shareholders |
Retail brokers | $3.2B | 35-48% | 22-29% | Schwab (SCHW), Robinhood (HOOD) shareholders |
Exchanges | $4.1B | 58-64% | 18-23% | ICE, NASDAQ (NDAQ) shareholders |
Clearing firms | $1.9B | 72-79% | 15-19% | DTCC (mutual), bank custodians |
Data vendors | $2.1B | 45-52% | 25-31% | Bloomberg, Refinitiv shareholders |
Regulatory bodies | $0.9B | N/A (nonprofit) | N/A | Taxpayer benefit (oversight) |
Total ecosystem | $20.9B | 51% avg | 24% avg | Financial industry |
Source: Company financial statements, industry estimates (2024)
The Evolution: Where This System Is Heading
PFOF Reform Scenarios: Who Wins, Who Loses
The SEC's ongoing debate over Payment for Order Flow (PFOF) regulation will create clear winners and losers across the financial services ecosystem.
Reform Scenario | Probability | Impact on Retail Investors | Industry Winners (Tickers) | Industry Losers (Tickers) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Complete PFOF Ban | 15% | Return of $2-5 commissions per trade; better execution quality | • Interactive Brokers (IBKR) | • Robinhood (HOOD) |
Enhanced Disclosure | 45% | More transparency on execution quality; minimal cost change | • All existing players maintain status quo | • Nobody (status quo preserved) |
Best Execution Mandate | 30% | 2-4 basis point improvement in execution; no commission change | • NYSE owner ICE | • Citadel Securities (private) |
Status Quo Maintained | 10% | No change; continued 5-11 bps hidden costs | • Robinhood (HOOD) | • Retail investors (opacity continues) |
Source: Industry analyst estimates, regulatory comment period analysis (2024)
Detailed Company Impact Analysis
Complete Ban Scenario Winners:
Interactive Brokers (IBKR): Already operates transparent fee structure; would gain market share from PFOF-dependent brokers. Stock would likely appreciate 15-25% on ban announcement.
Fidelity (Private): Diversified revenue model not dependent on PFOF; strong brand for quality-conscious investors fleeing commission-dependent platforms.
Complete Ban Scenario Losers:
Robinhood (HOOD): 68% of transaction revenue from PFOF. Would need to charge $2-5 per trade or find alternative monetization. Stock would likely decline 40-60% on ban.
Virtu Financial (VIRT): $1.9B in retail market making revenue at risk. Would retain institutional business but lose highest-margin segment. Expected decline 25-35%.
Best Execution Mandate Winners:
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE): Owns NYSE; would benefit from order flow shifting to exchanges vs off-exchange market makers.
Nasdaq Inc (NDAQ): Similar exchange benefit; transparent pricing model favored under best execution standards.
IEX Group (Private): Purpose-built for best execution; would gain market share from 2.8% currently to estimated 8-12%.
Technology Disruption: The DeFi Threat
Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) and blockchain settlement could eliminate 4-5 intermediaries:
Remove market makers through automated market maker (AMM) algorithms
Eliminate clearing through blockchain settlement
Reduce custody through self-custody wallets
Compress 2-day settlement to minutes
However: Current DEX limitations include:
Insufficient liquidity for large trades (slippage 5-15%)
High gas fees during network congestion ($20-200 per trade)
Regulatory uncertainty for securities tokens
Lack of investor protection mechanisms
Settlement Method | Speed | Cost | Intermediaries | Adoption Timeline |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Current T+1 | 24 hours | 0.05-0.11% | 6 entities | Current standard |
Real-time settlement (proposed) | Instant | 0.03-0.07% | 4 entities | 2027-2029 estimate |
Blockchain/DLT | Minutes | 0.01-0.03% + gas | 2 entities | 2030+ (if regulatory approval) |
Pure DEX (DeFi) | Seconds | 0.30-1.50% (includes slippage) | 0 entities | Uncertain for securities |
Alternative Trading Systems: The Quiet Revolution
IEX (Investors Exchange) operates a "speed bump" exchange that delays orders by 350 microseconds to prevent high-frequency trading advantages. Results:
2.8% market share (2024)
No PFOF relationships
18% lower effective spreads for retail orders
Negligible price improvement vs traditional exchanges
Why hasn't IEX grown faster? Retail brokers receive $0 PFOF from routing to IEX, creating a disincentive to route orders there despite better execution quality.
Behavioral Finance: Why You Don't Optimize Execution
Retail investors consistently fail to minimize trading costs due to:
Present bias: Immediate execution gratification vs 3-5% annual cost optimization
Complexity aversion: Understanding PFOF, limit orders, and execution quality requires effort
Free fallacy: Psychological impact of "$0 commission" masks actual costs
Small numbers neglect: 0.05% seems irrelevant despite 12%+ annualized for active traders
Investor Behavior Pattern | Prevalence | Annual Cost Impact | Mitigation Strategy |
|---|---|---|---|
Market orders exclusively | 78% of retail | 0.08-0.15% | Use limit orders 5 cents above bid/ask |
Momentum chasing | 64% of retail | 2.3-4.7% | Wait 48 hours after news, avoid FOMO |
Overtrading (10+ trades/month) | 31% of retail | 0.6-1.8% | Reduce frequency 50%, increase position size |
Bid-ask spread ignorance | 89% of retail | 0.03-0.12% | Check spread before trading, avoid illiquid stocks |
Investment Decision Framework: Minimize What You Pay
Investor Type | Optimal Broker Choice | Expected Friction Cost | Implementation Strategy |
|---|---|---|---|
Buy-and-hold (1-3 trades/year) | Any major broker acceptable | 0.03-0.08% annually | Market orders acceptable; focus on research not execution |
Moderate trader (4-12 trades/year) | Schwab (SCHW), Fidelity, Vanguard | 0.15-0.35% annually | Use limit orders, trade liquid large-caps only |
Active trader (2-5 trades/week) | Interactive Brokers (IBKR) | 0.8-1.5% annually | Direct market access, negotiate fees, use IEX routing |
Day trader (20+ trades/week) | Interactive Brokers (IBKR), TradeStation | 1.5-3.5% annually | Professional platform, rebate capture, maker orders |
Critical threshold: If trading costs exceed 0.50% annually, you're destroying long-term compounding. A portfolio growing 10% annually with 0.50% friction becomes 9.50%—over 30 years, that's 31% less wealth ($1.74M vs $2.52M on $100K initial).
Publicly Traded Beneficiaries: Investment Opportunities
Investors seeking exposure to the trading infrastructure ecosystem can invest in these public companies:
Primary Beneficiaries (Direct Exposure)
Company | Ticker | Market Cap | 2024 Revenue | Exposure to Retail Trading |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Robinhood Markets | HOOD | $18.4B | $2.1B | 100% (pure play) |
Charles Schwab | SCHW | $157B | $19.4B | ~15% from trading |
Interactive Brokers | IBKR | $16.2B | $4.1B | ~40% from trading |
Virtu Financial | VIRT | $3.8B | $3.2B | ~60% from market making |
Infrastructure Providers (Indirect Exposure)
Company | Ticker | Market Cap | 2024 Revenue | Exposure to Trading Volume |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Intercontinental Exchange | ICE | $89B | $8.7B | ~28% from equities trading |
Nasdaq Inc | NDAQ | $43B | $6.2B | ~27% from trading services |
Cboe Global Markets | CBOE | $21B | $4.3B | ~65% from trading |
CME Group | CME | $94B | $5.8B | ~75% from trading (futures) |
Banking Infrastructure (Custody Services)
Company | Ticker | Market Cap | Custody AUM | Custody Revenue % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
State Street | STT | $28B | $43.7T | ~32% of revenue |
Bank of New York Mellon | BK | $52B | $46.8T | ~28% of revenue |
JPMorgan Chase | JPM | $627B | $34.1T | ~8% of revenue |
Source: Company 10-K filings, market data (October 2024)
The Bottom Line: Who Really Wins
Every stock trade generates $0.03-$0.06 per share in total economic value distributed across the financial industry. For retail investors trading 1,000 shares monthly:
Annual friction cost: $360-$720
Over 30-year investing lifetime: $10,800-$21,600 (undiscounted)
Opportunity cost (at 10% growth): $68,000-$136,000
The actual beneficiaries ranked by total value extraction:
Rank | Entity Type | % of Total Friction | Annual Revenue | Key Players |
|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Market makers | 42% | $8.7B | Citadel, Virtu (VIRT) |
2 | Exchanges | 20% | $4.1B | ICE, NDAQ, CBOE |
3 | Retail brokers | 15% | $3.2B | SCHW, HOOD, IBKR |
4 | Data vendors | 10% | $2.1B | Bloomberg, Refinitiv |
5 | Clearing firms | 9% | $1.9B | DTCC, custodian banks |
6 | Regulatory bodies | 4% | $0.9B | SEC, FINRA |
The elimination of explicit commissions successfully increased retail trading volume 88% while simultaneously increasing total industry revenue 34%. This is not a coincidence—it's the intended outcome of a market structure designed to monetize uninformed order flow through opacity rather than transparency.
Investment Thesis: How to Profit From This Knowledge
For Portfolio Positioning:
Long PFOF-dependent brokers if you believe status quo continues: Robinhood (HOOD) offers highest beta to retail trading volume but carries regulatory risk.
Long execution quality platforms if you believe reform is coming: Interactive Brokers (IBKR) benefits from either PFOF ban or best execution mandate.
Long exchange operators for diversified exposure: Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) and Nasdaq (NDAQ) benefit from increased transparency requirements and have stable data revenue.
Short market makers if best execution mandate passes: Virtu Financial (VIRT) faces margin compression under stricter execution standards.
For Your Own Trading:
Action Item | Expected Annual Savings | Implementation Difficulty |
|---|---|---|
Switch to Interactive Brokers for active trading | 0.3-0.8% of traded capital | Low (1-2 hours) |
Use limit orders instead of market orders | 0.05-0.15% of traded capital | Low (immediate) |
Trade only liquid large-cap stocks | 0.02-0.08% of traded capital | Medium (requires discipline) |
Reduce trading frequency by 50% | 0.5-1.5% of portfolio annually | High (behavioral change) |
Request IEX routing at your broker | 0.02-0.05% of traded capital | Low (one-time request) |
The question isn't whether you pay for trades. You always pay. The question is whether you understand enough about the payment structure to minimize what you pay and to whom.
For investors seeking execution quality over marketing promises: Use limit orders, avoid market orders during high volatility, trade liquid large-cap stocks preferentially, and consider brokers offering direct routing to IEX or other non-PFOF exchanges. The industry profits most from uninformed, impatient market orders on illiquid securities—be the opposite.
